AFTER EMPIRE
MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES
AND NATION-BUILDING

The Soviet Union and the Russian,
Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires

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For our grandparents
who were born in the Habsburg and Ottoman empires
and lived most of their lives after empire

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Common sense tells us that empires rise and fall. We know that the Roman, Habsburg, Ottoman, and Romanov realms were called empires, and we know—from history or, more precisely, from historians—that they had temporally identifiable beginnings and ends. Not surprisingly, we conclude that the history of entities called empires must hold the explanatory key to the rise and fall of empires.

The intuition is correct, but only up to a point. It is of course trivially true that historical knowledge about self-styled empires is indispensable to theorizing about empires. But, as the case of the Soviet Union shows, empires in name are not all there is to empire. For if we may, as we in fact do, term the USSR an empire, even though its leaders never called it that, then, surely, we are equally entitled to go against the terminological preferences of self-styled emperors and insist that their realms really may not have been empires.

Coming to grips with the rise and fall of empires as a class of objects with certain properties must also involve something so obvious—and so obviously tedious for most historians—as a conceptual analysis. Only after the concept of empire (as well as of rise and fall, but that is a subject for another essay) has been delineated and defined, with respect to its semantic field and in terms of history, experience, knowledge, intuition, and the like, is an empirical inquiry appropriate. On its own, historical investigation, no matter how rich, detailed, and nuanced, is powerless either to explain why empires rise and fall or even to identify the class of entities that rise and fall. After all, induction, like deduction, presupposes the ability to distinguish ravens from non-ravens and black from non-black.

This argument does not dispute the ontological reality of historical events, but it does assume that they are knowable only through the mediation of our own language and concepts. It may thus be interesting to ask why and how historical
subjects perceived their reality as they did, but it is manifestly impossible—pace Leopold von Ranke's aspirations—for us to recreate or experience it.⁺ The work of Robert Darnton shows that a sense of bewilderment inevitably accompanies our confrontation with historical actors.⁸ We may study their language, their texts, and their opinions, but we can never break out of our own hermeneutic circle and enter theirs. More important, if we could pull off such a trick, our understanding of history would actually be impaired. As Arthur Danto has persuasively argued, the conceptual distance imposed upon us by the passage of time makes history possible.⁹ It is precisely because our perspective is rooted in the future that we can comprehend the past, and not merely chronicle past events.

**What Empire Might Be**

Let us begin the conceptual analysis of empire by unpacking what may be its two least unacceptable defining characteristics.¹⁰ Most scholars would probably agree that every empire consists of something called a core and something called a periphery.¹¹ And most might agree that both core and periphery, whatever they are, are situated in geographically bounded spaces inhabited by culturally differentiated elites and populations.¹² By "culturally differentiated" I mean that core elites and populations share certain cultural characteristics and are different, with respect to these characteristics, from their counterparts in the periphery. It matters not whether these characteristics are physically real or merely imagined.

If cores are situated in bounded spaces, what, then, is situated inside cores? A sensible answer, and for two reasons, is organizations, and not, as one might expect, institutions. One reason is that such a notion of core echoes Max Weber's classic definition of the state, and empires are states. Another is that, thanks to the "new institutionalists," an institution has come to mean virtually everything under the sun, thereby becoming almost useless as a concept.¹³

The organizations that constitute a core must, I suggest, be (1) political, economic, and sociocultural (multidimensional); (2) located in a bounded geographic space (territorially concentrated); (3) supportive of one another (mutually reinforcing); and (4) endowed with significant decisionmaking authority (centralized). In sum, a core is a multidimensional set of territorially concentrated and mutually reinforcing organizations exercising highly centralized authority in a state. In contrast to cores, peripheries are the territorially bounded administrative outposts of central organizations. While there can only be one core in an empire, there must be at least two peripheries for empires to be distinguishable from bifurcated states, such as the former Czechoslovakia.

Not surprisingly, the relationship of core to core elite is already implicit in the two concepts. Thus, we expect core elites to run core organizations. By the same logic, peripheral elites run peripheral organizations. The running of core organizations manifests itself in a variety of ways, some typical of nonimperial states and some peculiar to empires. We expect core elites, like all state elites, to craft foreign and defense policy, print the currency, and control borders. But imperial elites must also have other prerogatives to be worthy of the modifier. They direct the finances of peripheries; they appoint peripheral governors or prefects; and they are not accountable to the periphery, which, in turn, has no legal basis for influencing the appointment of core officials and the choice of core policies. While the relationship of core elite to core elite must therefore be termed dictatorial, that of core elite to core population and of peripheral elite to peripheral population is indeterminate.¹⁴ I emphasize that this understanding of empire, in its exclusive emphasis on the core-periphery relationship, has nothing specific to say about the regime either of the core polity or of the peripheral polity.

While a species both of multinational state and of dictatorship, an empire is not merely a dictatorial multinational state, but a peculiar kind of dictatorial multinational state. Figure 3.1 situates the concept of empire within a family of related polities. Ethnoterritorial federations, such as Canada, former socialist Yugoslavia, and post-Soviet Russia, have culturally distinct administrative units, but no core institutions. Such multinational dictatorial states as Franco Spain and Saddam Hussein's Iraq have cores, but lack culturally bounded administrative units. Multinational nondictatorial states and territorial federations such as the United States and Switzerland possess neither cores nor distinct cultural units. In empires, meanwhile, territorially bounded cores and peripheries are discontinuous with culturally distinct administrative units. More than a simple dictatorial multinational state, an empire is a highly centralized, territorially segmented, and culturally differentiated state within which centralization, segmentation, and differentiation overlap.¹⁵

Although I am certain that this definition, like all definitions, will not meet with universal acclaim, I am equally certain that it makes some sense conceptually and even fits the facts historically. Because the Persian, Roman, early Byzan-

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**FIGURE 3.1 Types of Multinational States**
tine, Mongol, Ottoman, Habsburg, Romanov, French, British, and Soviet poli-
ties possessed the defining characteristics of empire, we are justified in saying
that they were indeed empires. In each, the organizations clustered in a cultur-
ally distinct region usually centered on a capital city and its hinterland exercised
direct control over the finances and elites of the rest of the empire.

Fully appreciative of the historian's delight in historical richness, we are not
surprised that the degree of cultural distinctiveness, like the degree of control,
varied, that all real empires only approximated the definitional ideal type. The
Ottomans of Constantinople, Rumelia, and Anatolia shared Islam with most
imperial elites; ethnic Germans formed a sizeable portion of tsarist Russia's rul-
ing elite; after 1867, Habsburg control over Hungary declined in a manner
reflective of the dynamics of "imperial decay"; all elites shared a Soviet Russian
culture in Leonid Brezhnev's USSR, while republican elites enjoyed a fair degree
of genuine autonomy.

Unwilling to reify historical richness and the representations, signs, and names
that constitute it, however, we are equally unsurprised by the fact that parts
of empires may be definitionally imperial, while others may not, and that, hence,
the same territory, with the same core state, may or may not be termed an empire
at various times in history, regardless of what it is officially called and how it
emerged. Accordingly, it would be illogical to call Byzantium an empire on the
eve of Constantinople's seizure by the Ottomans in 1453, or fail to recognize that
Moscow's relationship with the USSR's East European satellites was no less
imperial than its relations with the non-Russian republics.

How Empires Rise

As a mental category that serves only to distinguish one class of objects from
other classes of objects, the concept of empire says nothing about the causes or
consequences of imperial rise or fall. To smuggle an explanation into the
concept of empire is a sleight of hand that conveniently proposes unsubstan-
tiated theories as definitions and typically results in claims that something
cannot be an empire if it is not the product of imperialism or the cause of exploita-


future, we can, in the spirit of the conceptually inspired inductivism of this essay,
confidently assert that an empire has emerged. And anytime any entity with
these three characteristics loses all or any of them, then we can just as con-
idently claim that an empire has disappeared. There is no reason why, logically,
all three characteristics cannot come together or fall away simultaneously—in
which case utterly new entities may be said to have emerged or disappeared. There
is also no reason why only one or two of these characteristics cannot appear or dis-
appear for the entities possessing them to gain or lose the status of empire.

Consider the implications of these observations. We generally assume that
empires come into existence only as a result of the extension of core control over
some potential periphery. Naturally, a core elite can extend its power into terri-
ories with already existing distinct elites and populations via military campaigns,
wars, and subsequent conquest and thus engage in straightforward imperialism.
History is rife with examples of just this sort of military expansionism and of the
empires to which it frequently gave rise. Rome may be the classic example.

But military conquest surely is not the only manner in which core elites can
expand the scope of their sovereignty. History offers just as many examples of
dynastic unions between powerful and weak monarchs resulting in the incorpo-
ration of the latter's realms on imperial terms. The rise of the Habsburg empire
and the emergence of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth are two such cases.
There is also no reason why, logically, "ready-made" peripheries cannot be bought
or otherwise acquired, perhaps by bribery or stealth—as was Bosnia in 1908 by
the Habsburgs, in clear violation of the resolutions of the Congress of Berlin.

The above examples concern only the third defining characteristic of empire,
the dictatorial relationship between a core elite and a peripheral elite. But
empires can also emerge if the other two characteristics involving distinct elites
and distinct populations undergo change. Logically, there is no reason why non-
dictatorial states with distinct elites and distinct populations should not be
termed empires if they become dictatorial or why dictatorial states cannot be
transformed into empires by virtue of the emergence of territorially bounded
distinct elites and/or territorially bounded distinct populations.

In the first instance, empire would be the product of an ethnoterritorial federa-
tion's development of, as Figure 3.1 suggests, dictatorial relations between its
units. In the second and third instances, empire would result from a multina-
tional dictatorial state's development of culturally distinct administrative units.
All three developments could also take place more or less simultaneously, if multina-
tional nondictatorial states were to develop culturally distinct administrative units
and cores for any number of internally specific political, social, or economic rea-
sons.

Post-Soviet Russia may soon be an example of the first possibility. At present,
the Russian state occupies the second quadrant of Figure 3.1. As an ethnoterrito-
rial federation, it has culturally distinct administrative units—the various
replicas—populated by distinct populations and run by distinct elites. Inasmuch
as Moscow’s relationship with these units is democratic at best and chaotic at worst, it cannot be deemed imperial. If current trends continue, however, that judgement may have to change. Boris Yeltsin has already abandoned many of the policies that contributed to his early democratic reputation; reactionary forces, on the left and on the right, are not insignificant; and “men on horseback” lurk in the wings. Should democratization be abandoned, de facto if not de jure, and should Moscow’s relations with the provinces then become dictatorial, the Russian Federation will have become, and rightly be deemed, an empire.

The USSR illustrates the second tendency, how an empire might emerge after a dictatorial state acquires distinct peripheral elites and populations. In creating the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Bolsheviks purposefully transformed revolutionary Russia’s simple dictatorship over its newly acquired territories into a complex web of imperial relationships premised on non-Russian administration of symbolically sovereign republics inhabited by distinct non-Russian populations. As politics is at the core of my definition of empire, the fact that many of the republics underwent modernization and that Russia paid a high price economically for its political dominance does not detract from the imperial nature of the Soviet state.

Showing how empires emerge—via expansion and the four possible moves suggested by Figure 3.1—cannot explain their emergence, but, it does underscore the magnitude of the explanatory task, suggest the kinds of theoretical questions that should be asked, and imply what the future of empire may be.

First of all, it is probably safe to say that a nontrivial theory of imperial emergence, one that explains all five patterns, will be, at best, immensely difficult to formulate. Indeed, a universal theory may be logically impossible, inasmuch as the explananda involved are quite different. Although the defining characteristics of empire do provide for identical initial conditions, the explanatory task seems either to require very different covering laws or to imply very different causes or combinations of necessary and sufficient conditions. Probabilistic accounts would be afflicted with the same problems.

While a “theory of everything” may therefore be beyond our grasp, there is no reason why more focused theoretical enterprises, such as providing plausible accounts of imperial emergence via territorial expansion, regime change, elite formation, and societal transformation, should not be possible. Indeed, there already exist rich social science and historical literatures on all of these issues. Peripheries, for example, may form as a result of modernization, education, uneven development, and the subsequent emergence of excluded ethnic entrepreneurs and “internal colonies.” The task before students of empire is to apply these insights, with the appropriate modifications, to imperial settings.

Finally, by having identified acquisition, union, war, dictatorial regimes, social differentiation, and excluded elites as possible sources of empire, we are in a position to speculate, more or less knowledgeably, about the likelihood that empires will continue to arise even in a “post-imperial” age. Somewhat unexpectedly perhaps, the picture is mixed.

Despite some fluctuations, most of the international sources of empire have declined in importance over the last two centuries. Land purchases became virtually impossible after the division of the world into a seamless web of states, and dynastic unions became irrelevant with the introduction of effectively non-monarchical regimes in all states. In contrast, war is still a going concern, even though some scholars question its utility. Less questionable, perhaps, is that one of the traditional goals of war, extensive territorial expansion, has become significantly more difficult to attain and sustain.

Two formidable obstacles stand in the way. Because modern states serve as the international system’s organizing principle, the inviolability of state boundaries is a generally accepted international norm and even “failed states” are usually preferred to territorial division. To be sure, norms do get violated and the reconfiguration of states does occur, but, as the fall of the USSR and Yugoslavia suggests, usually as a last resort. In any case, if and when aggressors threaten security and regional stability, great-power intervention or geopolitical balancing generally suffices to stifle or keep expansion within reasonable limits. In sum, the reduction in opportunities for, and the growth of incentives to, traditional imperialism suggest that empires are unlikely to emerge in this manner in the foreseeable future.

But recall that there are two other ways for empires to come into being. There is, first, no reason to think that existing non-dictatorial systems will never break down and become dictatorial and that all transitions to democracy will succeed. Quite the contrary, we know from history, from the extensive literature on democratic breakdowns, and from the transparent teleology of the concept of transition that democracies do end and that democratization can fail.

The second internal source of empire, differentiation, is even more likely in the near future. All that modernization is supposed to entail—industrialization, education, urbanization, and so on—not only occurs unevenly, thus creating pockets, if not whole areas, of backward development, but also leads to social differentiation and elite frustration. And if, as the history of modernization leads us inductively to expect, these continue to breed ethnic assertiveness, regional patriotism, and communal identities, then the probability that distinct elites and populations, unsuccessful separatist movements, nondemocratic relations between cores and peripheries, and thus empires will emerge should remain correspondingly high.

These remarks do not constitute a theory of imperial emergence, but they do suggest that, although the sources of empire have undergone a shift in the last century or so, the emergence of empire is, ceteris paribus, unlikely to be affected in any substantive way. Although the international sources of empire may have declined in importance, the internal sources are not only present, but, arguably, have assumed greater salience. And because empires can emerge silently—without noisy campaigns or bombastic proclamations of manifest destiny—they should continue to exist in everything but name for some time to come.
How Empires Fall

As the foregoing remarks intimated, the fall of empires can proceed along lines very similar to those of the rise of empires, involving both externally and internally generated processes that transform interstate relationships, regimes, societies, and elites. First on our list, although not necessarily primary in importance, are wars and national liberation struggles, both of which can produce long-term processes of decline by attrition, as in the case of the Ottomans, or complete and instantaneous collapse, as was true of the Romanovs, Habsburgs, and Soviets. Inasmuch as liberation struggles are commonplace and war has hardly disappeared, both should continue to exert a corrosive influence on putative empires.

While dynastic divorces and family squabbles have contributed to the breakup or diminution of realms in the past, they are much less likely to do so now and in the future. After all, dynasties are out of fashion and, even if they were not, core elites would surely prevent peripheral elites from leaving an empire with their erstwhile realms in hand. In contrast, while parts of empires have been sold in the past—Louisiana and Alaska come to mind—there is reason to think that, if economic globalization truly diminishes the value of territorial holdings, such entrepreneurial practices may revive in the future.

Just as the emergence of a dictatorial relationship between core and periphery can transform an ethnoterritorial federation into an empire, so, too, the demise of such a relationship can transform an empire into an ethnoterritorial federation. Although I prefer to characterize Vienna's post-1867 relations with Budapest as an example of imperial decay, it is admittedly possible to claim that a qualitative change had taken place after the Ausgleich and that, with Budapest's acquisition of approximate political parity, the late Habsburg empire ceased being fully imperial across much of its territory.

Similar reasoning holds for the other entities populating Figure 3.1. If peripheral or core populations or elites lose their distinctiveness, or if regime change accompanies population and elite shifts, then empires cease to exist. In the middle of the nineteenth century, for instance, when Ukraine's formerly distinct Cossack elite had disappeared and its population seemed to be only a Little Russian variant of the Great Russian people, "imperial" cannot be the best modifier for the Russo-Ukrainian relationship.

As with the silent emergence of empires, such internal realignments can occur as the result of economic development, demographic movement, and the resultant intermixing and assimilation of ethnic groups. In addition, the actions of core elites—such as forcible assimilation, population resettlement, and ethnic cleansing—can play, and historically have played, a major role in promoting, in effect if not in intent, the transformation of imperial peripheries into mere regions of dictatorial multinational states. The Soviet Union provides examples of each of these policies. Thus, non-Russians were subjected to varying degrees of cultural and linguistic Russification; Russians were settled throughout all the republics; and Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Koreans, Chechens, and Ingush were effectively cleansed from their homelands. Not surprisingly, the creation of national states in Western Europe, or for that matter in North America, would also be inexplicable without reference to equally brutal actions aimed at eradicating core-periphery distinctions.

The Future of Empire

As with the rise of empire, identifying the forms of imperial decline does not amount to an explanation, but it does suggest that a unified theory explaining so many different hypotheses is probably impossible, that theories accounting for particular forms of decline are perfectly possible and, indeed, may already exist in the social science literature, and that educated guesses about the future sustainability of empire can be made.

As there is no reason to repeat my remarks about the first two points, let us proceed directly to an evaluation of the forces working for and against empire, now and in the future. I start with the observation that, by and large, the same factors that can bring empire into existence can also end it. While seemingly banal, this proposition does have one important implication. If other things are held equal, we have no grounds for claiming, finally and conclusively, that empire is no longer possible. Scholars and policymakers who speak of the passing of the "age of empires" may be premature in their judgement.

But, as we saw, other things are not equal. One important difference was that, wilfully or not, the core elites of empires have frequently pursued policies—such as assimilation, resettlement, and genocide—aimed at ending the core-periphery distinction. That contemporary elites have been especially prone to act in this manner may mean that empire is an inefficient organizational system, and that modern administration proceeds more smoothly if populations speak the same language and if local elites lose their collective character and are absorbed into the state as individuals, and not as groups. Inasmuch as assimilation presumably furthers the effective administration of empire, modern core elites would seem to have a direct, if perhaps unwitting, interest in the demise of the very empires they rule.

Do these arguments spell the end of empire? For better or for worse, the answer is "no." Although the logic of the modern bureaucratic state may be incompatible with that of empire, it does not follow that state elites actually have the capacity, wherewithal, or skills either to eliminate empire or to do so in a manner that will not aggravate core-periphery relations or even create core-periphery distinctions. The literature on the crisis of the state in general and of the national state in particular provides ample grounds for paying heed to the limitations on elites. This caveat is of particular relevance today, when the language of human rights and self-determination dominates international discourse, when identity may have become the key criterion of political loyalty, and
when state attempts to deal with ethnic diversity are almost invariably represented as encroachments on cultural authenticity and thus become inducements to ethnic mobilization.

Where do these remarks leave us? On the one hand, somewhat less uncertain about the rise and fall of empire. On the other hand, quite certain that the forces promoting the silent emergence of empires and the incapacity of modern states to cope with an increasingly assertive multinationality could even work in favor of empire. Terminological conventions and political niceties may dictate that such entities not be called empires, but, by meeting not unreasonable definitional requirements, they will be just that. Ironically, although imperialism may belong to the past, empire may belong to the future.

Notes


2. For an excellent discussion of these conceptual issues, see John Wilson, Thinking with Concepts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).

3. Much of my thinking about concepts has been influenced by Giovanni Sartori, Social Science Concepts (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984), 15–85.


5. Von Ranke’s famous dictum was, of course, that history should be written “wie es eigentlich gewesen sei.”


8. This section draws on Alexander J. Motyl, “After Empire: Competing Discourses and Interstate Conflict in Postimperial Eastern Europe,” in ed. Barnett Rubin and Jack Snyder, Political Order in the Former Soviet Republics, forthcoming.


11. For a striking example of how broadly—and uselessly—the concept is used, see Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

12. I discuss this relationship in “From Imperial Decay to Imperial Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Empire in Comparative Perspective,” in ed. Richard L. Rudolph and David F. Good, Nationalism and Empire (New York: St. Martin’s, 1992), 15–43.

13. This definition clearly resonates with Michael Doyle’s: “Empire ... is a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society” (Empires [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986], 45).


15. Recall that definitions are semantically equivalent statements of the “A is B” variety, whereby any sentence containing concept A could be written with concept B, and vice versa, without any change in meaning. In contrast, explanations are roughly of the “If X, then Y” form and posit some kind of causal connection between X and Y. The resulting error can be written as “A is (If X, then Y)” or “If X, then Y) is B.”


